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A THEORY OF TORT LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
KRISTA J. SCHOENHEIDERt
Women have faced the problem of sexual harassment in the work-
place ever since they entered the labor force.' As a social, political, and
legal term, sexual harassment is susceptible to a variety of definitions.
2
It can describe conduct ranging from an "accidental" brushing against
t A.B. 1984, Bryn Mawr College; J.D. Candidate 1987, University of Penn-
sylvania.
See generally Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Dis-
tance Travelled and the Distance Yet to Go, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 445, 448-52 (1981)
(discussing the history of sexual harassment in the United States). See also L. FARLEY,
SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 56-68
(1980) (history of sexual harassment from the 1860's to the beginning of the modern
labor movement).
This Comment focuses on the harassment of women by men because sexual har-
assment in the employment context is generally viewed as a problem faced exclusively
by women: "[T]he common denominator is that the perpetrators tend to be men, the
victims women." C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 28 (1979). The analysis presented herein, however,
could conceivably apply to sexual harassment of men by women, women by women,
and men by men.
2 MacKinnon broadly defines sexual harassment as "the unwanted imposition of
sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power." C. MACKIN-
NON, supra note 1, at 1. Farley's definition refers specifically to workplace harassment:
"unsolicited nonreciprocal male behavior . . . that asserts a woman's sex role over her
function as a worker." L. FARLEY, supra note 1, at 14. The Working Women's Insti-
tute provides a more precise definition:
Sexual harassment in employment is any attention of a sexual nature in
the context of the work situation which has the effect of making a woman
uncomfortable on the job, impeding her ability to do her work, or interfer-
ing with her employment opportunities. . . . At one extreme, it is the
direct demand for sexual compliance coupled with the threat of firing if a
woman refuses. At the other, it is being forced to work in an environment
in which, through various means, such as sexual slurs and/or the public
display of derogatory images of women or the requirement that she dress
in sexually revealing clothing, a woman is subjected to stress or made to
feel humiliated because of her sex. Sexual harassment is behavior which
becomes coercive because it occurs in the employment context, thus threat-
ening both a woman's job satisfaction and security.
Working Women's Institute, Sexual Harassment on the Job: Questions and Answers
180 (unpublished manuscript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review);
accord Vermeulen, Comments on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
Proposed Amendment Adding Section 1604.11, Sexual Harassment, to Its Guidelines
on Sexual Discrimination, 6 WOMEN'S RTs. L. RE'. 285 (1980). Compare this defini-
tion with the narrower one presented in the Guidelines of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (E.E.O.C.), infra text accompanying note 42.
(1461)
1462 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
a woman's body or an unwanted touching or kissing to a physical as-
sault' such as rape.4 Sexual harassment also assumes verbal forms, such
as suggestive remarks or derogatory comments5 or direct demands for
sex.
6
Sexual harassment has a devastating effect on both the economic
opportunities and the physical and emotional well-being of working
women.7 Although sexual harassment constitutes employment discrimi-
nation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, legal protection against
harassment remains grossly inadequate. Because Title VII remedies are
primarily injunctive, they fail to compensate fully for the severe per-
sonal harm inflicted upon most victims." Punitive damages, which can
impose a powerful deterrent on an offending party, are also
unavailable.9
With the exception of some state antidiscrimination laws, 0 tort
law is the only body of law that provides a private remedy for personal
harm caused by sexual harassment; moreover, only tort law allows the
victim to receive an award of punitive damages when appropriate. In
its present form, however, tort law fails to deal with the full effects of
harassment on the individual victim. 1 In the absence of at least a
threat of physical injury or other conduct a court deems to be suffi-
3 See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J.
1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (employer physically restrained plaintiff
and threatened her with harm if she did not comply with his sexual demands).
4 See C. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 2, 29; Andrews, The Legal and Economic
Implications of Sexual Harassment, 14 N.C. CENT. L.J. 113, 119 (1983).
6 See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 934 (D.N.J. 1978)
(male coworkers "made bad remarks concerning [plaintiff's] marital status, and
trumpeted their speculations and even made wagers concerning [plaintiff's] virginity").
s See, e.g., Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1045.
7 See infra notes 39-83 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
g See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2801 (West 1985) (authorizing pri-
vate action for damages for violations of state antidiscrimination laws); MINN. STAT
ANN. § 363.071 (West 1986) (examiner in employment discrimination hearing author-
ized to "order [employer] to pay an aggrieved party, who has suffered discrimination,
compensatory damages"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.39(c) (West 1985) (if examiner
finds that employer has engaged in discrimination, she may order payment of damages
to plaintiff). In fact, certain state antidiscrimination statutes provide exclusive remedies.
See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 9 (West 1976) (If petitioner files civil
action for damages or injunctive relief, any complaint pending before state commission
is "dismissed without prejudice."); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(b) (Purdon 1986)
(procedure under state Human Relations Act is "exclusive and the final determination
therein shall exclude any other action, civil or criminal, based on the same grievance of
the complaint concerned." A complainant who "institutes any action based on such
grievance without resorting to the procedure provided in this Act . . . may not subse-
quently resort to the procedure herein."); see also infra note 89.
11 See infra notes 100-42 and accompanying text.
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ciently "outrageous," a plaintiff can rarely rely on traditional tort theo-
ries for adequate compensation.
This Comment argues that Title VII, as presently interpreted by
the federal courts, fails to redress fully the severe emotional and physi-
cal harm caused by sexual harassment in the workplace. Furthermore,
the rigidity of state tort law generally prevents a harassment victim
from recovering damages when her harm truly deserves compensation.
In view of the inadequacies of existing law, this Comment proposes
that courts recognize an independent cause of action in tort for sexual
harassment in the employment context. By offering a legal remedy for a
worker's personal harm and a deterrent in the form of punitive dam-
ages, a tort theory directed specifically at workplace harassment would
provide an important supplement to the equitable remedies presently
available under federal employment discrimination law.
Part I of this Comment details sexual harassment's adverse effects
on working women. Part II outlines and questions the effectiveness of
the remedies made available to harassment victims through Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act. Part III provides a similar analysis of the reme-
dies available under traditional tort law. Finally, Part IV proposes an
alternate tort claim for sexual harassment that, if implemented, would
result in adequate recovery for plaintiffs and an effective deterrent to
harassment in the workplace.
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON WORKING WOMEN
Generally, harassment can be classified into two groups: "quid pro
quo" and "absolute" harassment. Quid pro quo or tangible harassment
occurs when an employer or supervisor conditions a job benefit or con-
tinued employment on the employee's compliance with sexual de-
mands. 12 For example,13 during a business lunch at which an office
worker and her employer are discussing the employee's future promo-
tion, the employer suddenly makes sexual advances. When the em-
ployee rejects her employer's propositions, he attempts to physically re-
strain her from leaving the table. Soon afterward, the office worker is
threatened with physical harm, demoted, and eventually fired.
In contrast to quid pro quo harassment, absolute-or intangi-
ble-harassment involves no threat to a concrete job benefit1 but in-
12 See Note, Employer Liability for Coworker Sexual Harassment Under Title
VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83, 85 (1984-85).
Is This example comes from Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F.
Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
14 See Note, supra note 12, at 87.
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stead creates a hostile work environment through unwanted, sexually
offensive conduct.1 5 A lobby attendant whose sexually revealing uni-
form attracts comments, gestures, and propositions from passersby ex-
periences intangible sexual harassment. 6 Similarly, a female industrial
engineer becomes a victim of intangible harassment when colleagues
bombard her with sexual jokes, make remarks about her marital status
and virginity, and draw an obscene cartoon to humiliate her.1
As the previous examples of intangible harassment illustrate, an
employer is not the exclusive source of sexual harassment in the work-
place. Co-employees18 and nonemployees, such as business clients, res-
taurant customers, and the general public, also subject women to har-
assment in the employment context.19
Sexual harassment has a devastating impact on the individual
worker. Victims suffer from insomnia, depression, nervousness, and
other symptoms of psychological harm,20 sometimes leading to a com-
plete emotional breakdown.21 The ,physical effects of harassment in-
clude headaches, backaches, nausea, loss of appetite, weight change,
and fatigue.2 Harassment clearly poses a serious threat to an em-
ployee's physical and mental well-being:
The anxiety and strain, the tension and nervous exhaustion
11 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404-05 (1986) (recognizing
"hostile environment" harassment as sex discrimination where the conduct interferes
with a person's work performance or creates a sexually offensive work environment).
16 See E.E.O.C. v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 604-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
17 See Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 934 (D.N.J. 1978).
11 See Vermeulen, supra note 2, at 287 ("Peers can exert tremendous power over
a woman's ability to remain on the job. They can sabotage work directly and indirectly.
Even absent such overt undermining efforts, peers can render the work environment so
tense, intolerable, and hostile that a woman is forced to leave the job.").
19 See id. (stating that "clients and customers are also a frequent source of sexual
harassment .... Harassment from this sector is similar in its impact to harassment
from coworkers."); see also C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 44 (discussing the sub-
jection of waitresses to propositions and unwanted touching).
20 A study published by the Working Women's Institute revealed that 96% of
harassment victims showed psychological symptoms such as fear, nervousness, anger,
and feelings of powerlessness, and that 12% of these victims were forced to seek ther-
apy. See Crull, The Impact of Sexual Harassment on the Job: A Profile of the Exper-
iences of 92 Women, WORKING WOMEN'S INSTITUTE RESEARCH SERIES, REPORT
No. 3, at 4 (1979) [hereinafter W.W.I. REPORT No. 3]; see also C. BRODSKY, THE
HARASSED WORKER 40 (1979) (discussing the psychological effects of harassment).
21 See, e.g., Gates v. Brockway Glass Co., 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2367 (C.D. Cal.
1976) (harassed female worker unable to work because of emotional breakdown), cited
in C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 50.
2 Sixty-three percent of the participants in the Working Women's Institute study
experienced these physical effects of sexual harassment. W.W.I. REPORT No. 3, supra
note 20, at 4; see also C. BRODSKY, supra note 20, at 40; C. MACKINNON, supra note
1, at 51 (discussing a harassed worker who experienced severe pain in her arms and
neck until she left her job).
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that accompany this kind of harassment take a terrific toll on
women workers. Nervous tics of all kinds, aches and pains
(which can be minor and irritating or can be devastatingly
painful) often accompany the onset of sexual harassment.
These pains and illnesses are the result of insoluble conflict,
the inevitable backlash of the human body in response to in-
tolerable stress which thousands of women must endure in
order to survive.
23
In addition, harassment on the job hinders a woman's chances of
economic advancement. The conflict and stress that a harassed worker
faces every day inevitably interferes with her job performance. At
worst, she will be fired for refusing to submit to sexual demands, or she
will be forced to resign because of offensive or hostile working condi-
tions.2 ' Even if she does not leave her job, the time and energy that she
must devote to dealing with harassment will certainly affect her per-
formance at work.25 Encounters with harassment reduce an employee's
motivation and desire for career advancement, ultimately discouraging
her from seeking promotions or positions in traditionally male-domi-
nated fields."
Collectively, the social and economic consequences of sexual har-
assment are quite severe. As both a form of discriminatory behavior
and a source of economic harm to women, harassment becomes a type
of employment discrimination. Sexual harassment reinforces the eco-
nomic subordination of women workers. Traditional employment pat-
terns have confined women to inferior jobs and restricted their opportu-
nities for advancement.27 The practice of sexual harassment is
13 L. Farley, Testimony before Commission on Human Rights of the City of New
York, Special Disadvantages of Women in Male-Dominated Work Settings 6 (April
21, 1975), quoted in C. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 52.
Sixty-six percent of the respondents to the Working Women's Institute's ques-
tionnaire were either fired or pressured into resigning. See W.W.I. REPORT No. 3,
supra note 20, at 4; see also Goodman, supra note 1, at 456 n.75 (discussing sexual
harassment cases in which the female worker had been fired or forced to resign).
See Vermeulen, supra note 2, at 288.
See id. at 287. Eighty-three percent of the participants in the Working
Women's Institute study felt that sexual harassment interfered with work, and they
experienced a loss of self-confidence and desire to be successful. W.W.I. REPORT No.
3, supra note 20, at 4.
7 See Women Employed, Employment Patterns: A Study of Discrimination and
Remedies, in WOMEN IN THE ECONOMY 41 (1978). Horizontal segregation confines
women to undesirable jobs involving "low interest or complexity, repetition and tedi-
ousness, little potential for self-direction, predominantly service-oriented, high contact
with customers, involvement with children, and keeping things clean." C. MAcKIN-
NON, supra note 1, at 11. Vertical segregation forces women to become subordinates of
men, who are authorized to do the "hiring, firing, supervising and promoting of
women." Id. at 12.
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ultimately an expression of dominance, serving to perpetuate women's
positions in "low paying and dead-end jobs."' 28 This characterization is
not limited to the conduct of employers and supervisors; often a male
coworker has a considerable amount of indirect power over female
employees.29
In addition, harassment ultimately causes severe economic harm to
women as a group. Although the extent of this harm is difficult to mea-
sure precisely, observable consequences include increased unemploy-
ment and absenteeism,30 obstacles to promotions and seniority,3" lower
income from lost earnings, a generally lower level of productivity, 2 and
substantial limitations to free choice within the scope of employment.33
The cycle of subordination and economic harm demonstrates that sex-
ual harassment both relies upon and maintains "women's structurally
inferior status."1
3 4
Despite the psychological, physical, economic, and societal damage
caused by sexual harassment, the development of a theory of liability
and legal remedy for its harm has been slow and unsatisfactory. In
early court cases, victims had to rely on traditional tort doctrines for
relief.3 5 As critics" during the 1970's pointed out, however, tort law
8 Andrews, supra note 4, at 165; see also C. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 9-10
(arguing that women traditionally have occupied inferior positions and that sexual har-
assment "works to keep women in such positions").
28 For example, a male coworker may have greater seniority or experience or be
more familiar with supervisors. See Andrews, supra note 4, at 166. Sex role condition-
ing plays a major part in coworker harassment as well. See id.
o See Andrews, supra note 4, at 168; Goodman, supra note 1, at 456.
31 See Andrews, supra note 4, at 166 n.376.
32 See id. at 167; Goodman, supra note 1, at 456, 466; Vermeulen, supra note 2,
at 285-88. Lowered productivity and inefficiency are natural results of factors such as
absenteeism and the physical and psychological consequences of harassment. See supra
notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
33 Sex discrimination adversely affects a female employee's free choices and oppor-
tunity costs with respect to experience, training, and selection of an occupation. In
particular, harassment limits free choice when submission to sexual advances becomes a
condition of receiving job benefits. See Andrews, supra note 4, at 168-69 (citing C.
LLOYD & B. Ni'mi, THE ECONOMICS OF SEX DIFFERENTIALs 3-5 (1979)) (presenting
a theory of sex discrimination from the perspective of free choices and opportunity
costs).
C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 9-10.
Early tort law provided "civil redress for sexual invasion at a time when social
morality was less ambiguous in defining a woman's sexuality as intrinsic to her virtue,
and her virtue as partially constitutive of her value, hence as capable of compensable
damage." C. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 164. Such cases generally focused on the
element of physical force in the harassment of women who, for the most part, were not
employed. Under the theories of battery, assault, and "indecent assault," courts granted
monetary relief to women for "offensive touching," Hough v. Iderhoff, 69 Or. 568, 139
P. 931 (1914), and unwanted kissing, Liljegren v. United Sys. Co., 227 S.W. 925 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1921) (railroad held responsible for drunken man falling on top of woman
and kissing her on the cheek); Craker v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 657, 659
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failed to address harassment as a pervasive social evil arising from the
widespread notion that female employees were inferior to male employ-
ees.3 7 Due in large part to the efforts of these legal critics, courts finally
have begun to treat sexual harassment not merely as an affront to an
individual's self-esteem but rather as a devastating form of discrimina-
tion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII). 8s
(1875) (railroad conductor found liable for grabbing and forcibly kissing young female
schoolteacher). Plaintiffs often could not recover for mental anguish unless the harm
had been intentional or the defendant's conduct had been "wanton." See, e.g., Martin
v. Jensen, 113 Wash. 290, 294-95, 193 P. 674, 676 (1920) (recovery for mental
anguish alone only allowed where suffering "is the result of a wanton or intentional
trespass on the person of a woman").
Skousen v. Nidy, 90 Ariz. 215, 367 P.2d 248 (1961), was one of the first cases that
seemed to accept the notion that sexual harassment was unlawful not because it dimin-
ished a woman's "value," but rather because it harmed her physically, mentally, and
economically. In Skousen, a female trailer park caretaker brought an action against her
employer for assault and battery. He had repeatedly attempted to seduce her by touch-
ing her in a sexual manner and, on several occasions, assaulting her violently. See id. at
216-17, 367 P.2d at 249. In upholding an award for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized the need to provide relief for the emo-
tional harm caused by sexual harassment. See id. at 218, 367 P.2d at 250 ("Mental
suffering, including shame from the indignities of the acts, is usually considered an
injury for which damages may be given.").
36 See, e.g., L. FARLEY, supra note 1; C. MACKINNON, supra note 1. The publi-
cation of studies and responses to questionnaires also brought attention to the problem
of sexual harassment on the job. See, e.g., Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job:
A Shocking Look at Sexual Harassment, REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 49; W.W.I. RE-
PORT No. 3, supra note 20.
37 See C. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 171-74..
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2000(e)(17) (1982). The earliest case in which a federal
district court held that quid pro quo harassment violated Title VII was Williams v.
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds and remanded sub
nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978), on remand Williams v. Civi-
letti, 487 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980). After Williams, several previously unsuccess-
ful suits in lower courts were reversed on appeal. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977); Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Garber v. Saxon Indus., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 4896 (E.D. Va. 1976), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Garber v. Saxon Busi-
ness Prods., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F.
Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1977);
Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd and
remanded sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Courts have only recently recognized intangible harassment as a form of employ-
ment discrimination. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (plain-
tiff subjected to sexual slurs, insults and innuendos, and other verbal harassment that
"took the form of extremely vulgar and offensive sexually related epithets"); Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 899, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) ("harangues of demeaning
sexual inquiries and vulgarities throughout the course of [employment]" were "suffi-
ciently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment," thereby giving rise to a cause of action under Title VII); Bundy
v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (employers violate Title VII if they
1986]
1468 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
UNDER TITLE VII
A. Title VII Standards and Remedies
The federal courts have recognized sexual harassment as a form of
employment discrimination violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.81 Although Title VII does not specifically refer to sexual
harassment, the Guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (Guidelines or E.E.O.C. Guidelines)40 define illegal har-
assment in the workplace and outline the scope of employer liability.
Through interpretations of Title VII and the E.E.O.C. Guidelines, fed-
eral courts have established the current standard of liability and relief
for sexual harassment.
1. What Constitutes Sexual Harassment
Under Title VII, an employer may not "fail or refuse to hire
or . . . discharge any individual or otherwise . . . discriminate against
any individual with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of such individual's . . . sex."' 1 The
E.E.O.C. Guidelines, published in 1980, explicitly classify sexual har-
assment as unlawful discrimination under Title VII. 42 These guidelines
provide the following definition of sexual harassment:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute
sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of
such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for em-
"create . . . or condone . . . a substantially discriminatory work environment, re-
gardless of whether the complaining employees [lose] any tangible job benefits"); Rob-
son v. Eva's Super Market, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 857, 861 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (record
contained "abundant evidence" from which court could find that employer's conduct
created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment). The Supreme Court
recently held that such harassment is a violation of Title VII. See Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
"B See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
40 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1986).
41 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1) (1982). Under Title VII, an "employer" is de-
fined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees . . . and any agent of such a person ... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b)
(1982).
42 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1986). The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission is charged with enforcing the nation's equal employment laws. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000(e)-5 (1982).
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ployment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such con-
duct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimi-
dating, hostile, or offensive working environment.43
Thus, the E.E.O.C. Guidelines' definition encompasses both quid pro
quo and intangible harassment." The Guidelines also outline a process
for determining whether certain forms of conduct constitute illegal har-
assment: "IT]he Commission will look at the record as a whole and at
the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual ad-
vances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred."'4 5 This
language suggests that under certain circumstances a finding of sexual
harassment could result even from "isolated, sporadic, or insulting
incidents."
46
As interpretive rules issued by an administrative agency, the
E.E.O.C. Guidelines are entitled to considerable deference 7 but do not
constitute binding rules of substantive law.48 Although courts have rec-
ognized both "quid pro quo" and intangible harassment as violations of
Title VII, the judicial standard that most courts apply is stricter than
that proposed in the Guidelines. For example, while the Guidelines
leave open the possibility that a single incident could constitute sexual
harassment, courts have required a showing of a pattern of harass-
ment.49 An isolated incident is too "trivial"; the conduct must be "suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] em-
ployment and create an abusive working environment.' ,0
According to some lower court cases, even a consistent pattern of
offensive conduct or speech is not necessarily actionable. In Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co.,51 for example, a federal district court determined
43 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1986).
4 The requirement of sexual compliance as a "term or condifion of an individ-
ual's employment," id., or "basis for employment decisions affecting such individual,"
id., constitutes quid pro quo, or tangible, harassment. Interference with work perform-
ance or the creation of an "intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment,"
id., refers to absolute, or intangible, harassment. See supra notes 12-17 and accompa-
nying text.
45 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1986).
46 Note, supra note 12, at 95.
41 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
48 See General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976); see also Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2405 (1986).
49 See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904-05 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,
943-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Cf. Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972) (finding discrimination by national origin).
50 Menitor, 106 S. Ct. at 2406 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
51 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
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that the vulgar language habitually used by the plaintiff's male supervi-
sor, even when combined with the display of sexually explicit posters of
women by her male coworkers, did not constitute a hostile or offensive
working environment for the sole female employee in the office. The
court concluded that the supervisor's language, while "annoying," was
not "so shocking or severe as to actually affect a female worker's
psyche."'52 As for the coworkers' posters, the court stated: "For better or
for worse, modern America features open displays of written or picto-
rial erotica. . . . Living in this milieu, the average American should
not be legally offended by sexually explicit posters."5 " The Rabidue
court apparently assumed that whether such posters appeared on the
front of a movie theater or whether they were displayed on the walls of
an office in which one woman had to work with several men, the effect
on women would be the same.
2. Standard of Employer Liability
Under Title VII, only employers may be held liable for sexual
harassment in the workplace, regardless of the identity of the actual
harasser. 54 The E.E.O.C. Guidelines impose a "constructive knowl-
edge" standard on the employer for harassment by coworkers and non-
employees, so that liability arises only if the employer knew or should
have known of the harassment. 55 For the conduct of agents and super-
visory employees, however, the Guidelines recommend a standard of
strict liability, irrespective of employer knowledge.5" In fact, the agent
or supervisor does not have to act affirmatively at all to be liable. Often
the plaintiff may simply show that a supervisor acquiesced in the be-
havior of coworkers.
57
Judicial adherence to these guidelines has been inconsistent and is
likely to remain so after Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.5 8 With re-
spect to liability for harassment by coworkers and nonemployees, courts
generally have followed the E.E.O.C. Guidelines by requiring that a
52 Id. at 432.
53 Id. at 433.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a) (1982).
55 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d), (e) (1985).
56 Id. § 1604.11(c).
37 See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (footnote omit-
ted) ("[G]enerally speaking, an employer is chargeable with Title VII violations occa-
sioned by discriminatory practices of supervisory personnel."); Robson v. Eva's Super
Market, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 857, 863 (N.D. Ohio 1982) ("[A]n employer or supervisor
may be held liable for employment discrimination where the employer or supervisor
acquiesces or condones unlawful acts practiced by subordinates.").
58 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
[Vol. 134:1461
TORT LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
plaintiff prove either actual or constructive knowledge on the part of
the employer.59 Courts also have conformed to the E.E.O.C. Guidelines
by holding employers strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment by
supervisors or agents, regardless of a company policy against discrimi-
nation or an internal grievance procedure."
Courts have been divided, however, over the standard of employer
liability for intangible harassment by a supervisor. In Vinson v. Tay-
lor,61 the District of Columbia Circuit adhered to the E.E.O.C. Guide-
lines by holding an employer strictly liable for a supervisor's intangible
harassment. The plaintiff, a bank teller-trainee, claimed that her super-
visor, a vice-president of the bank, had forced her to have sexual rela-
tions with him. In addition to demanding sexual favors, the supervisor
frequently caressed the trainee and exposed himself to her. The bank
ultimately discharged the plaintiff for excessive use of sick leave.62
Although the district court dismissed Vinson's claim,63 the District
of Columbia Circuit held that the bank would be liable for the hostile
work environment created by the supervisor's conduct. The bank's lia-
bility would not be affected by the fact that the bank's higher manage-
ment had no knowledge of the supervisor's behavior:
Instead of providing a reason for employers to remain oblivi-
ous to conditions in the workplace, we think the enlightened
purpose of Title VII calls for an interpretation cultivating an
incentive for employers to take a more active role in war-
ranting to each employee that he or she will enjoy a working
environment free from illegal sex discrimination."
In contrast to this approach, the Eleventh Circuit has refused to
hold an employer liable for intangible harassment committed by a su-
pervisor unless the plaintiff can prove that the employer knew or
should have known of the supervisor's conduct.6 5 The employee would
be able to demonstrate such knowledge by showing that she had com-
1 See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (Plaintiff has to
demonstrate that the "employer knew or should have known of the harassment.");
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982) (Plaintiff must show
that the "employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question.").
60 See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (em-
ployer bank liable in Title VII suit for discriminatory firing by plaintiff's supervisor
even though "the bank had an established policy against what . . . supervisor did").
6- 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affld in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Meritor
Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106. S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
62 See id. at 143.
63 See Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980).
Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d at 151.
65 See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
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plained to upper management about the harassment. She could also
show that the harassment was so pervasive that the employer had or
should have known of the discrimination.
6
6
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,6 7 the Supreme Court made
tentative steps toward resolving this conflict. Although the Court de-
clined to issue a "definitive" rule on employer liability, it concluded
that neither strict liability nor constructive knowledge provided a satis-
factory standard in cases of intangible harassment. Instead, trial courts
should look to "agency principles" for guidance." Most importantly,
perhaps, the Court refused to endorse the E.E.O.C. Guidelines' ap-
proach to such cases. The continued viability of the Guidelines may
now be open to question.
6
1
3. Relief Under Title VII
When an employer is held liable for unlawful sex discrimination,
Title VII authorizes the court to enjoin the employer from practicing
discrimination and to "order such affirmative action as may be appro-
priate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring
of employees, with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate."70 Additionally, an award of a
"reasonable attorney's fee" lies within the court's discretion.7 ' These
remedies are intended to further the two primary objectives of Title
VII: to eliminate employment discrimination, and to "make persons
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful discrimination.
'7 2
68 See id.
67 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
" See id. at 2408.
69 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission itself seems to have recon-
sidered its adherence to the E.E.O.C. Guidelines' standards for supervisor harassment.
In Vinson, the E.E.O.C. filed an amicus brief proposing a standard for supervisor
harassment that conflicted with that recommended by the original E.E.O.C. Guidelines.
It argued that employers that have an express policy against sexual harassment and
that have implemented a procedure specifically designed to resolve harassment claims
generally should not be held liable for intangible harassment when the victim has not
taken advantage of the grievance procedure. See id. (quoting the E.E.O.C.'s amicus
brief at 23). An employer could still be liable under the agency's standard if it has
"actual knowledge" of a sexually hostile environment. Actual knowledge can be in-
ferred from the filing of a complaint through the employer's harassment procedure or
from management's knowledge of the particular harassment at issue. Id. The employer
could also be liable if the harassment victim had no reasonably available avenue for
making her complaint known to management. Id. Future harassment victims, therefore,
cannot even rely on the E.E.O.C. to enforce its own standard.
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(g) (1982).
71 Id. § 2000(e)-5(k).
72 Note, supra note 12, at 105 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 418 (1975)).
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Although equitable relief can encompass a wide range of reme-
dies-including injunctions, declaratory relief, and monetary
awards7A-federal courts have construed the language of Title VII to
exclude any award of compensatory or punitive damages."4 Thus, if a
female worker is fired for refusing to comply with her employer's de-
mands for sex, the court may order reinstatement with backpay and
other lost economic benefits,7 5 enjoin the employer from causing or per-
mitting future harassment, order the employer to take affirmative steps
to eliminate sexual harassment and to better deal with employees' com-
plaints, ' and award reasonable attorneys' fees.
If an employer is found liable for intangible harassment, relief is
necessarily limited to injunctions or orders to take affirmative action;
attorneys' fees may be granted as well." The court does not need to
order reinstatement: by definition, intangible harassment means that
the victim has not been fired but rather has been forced to work in a
hostile environment.
73 See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.1, at 24-27 (1973).
At common law, the English Court of Chancery was authorized to issue "coercive,"
"restitutionary," and declarative relief as the Chancellor deemed appropriate. Id. at 25.
"I See, e.g., Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 926-27 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 n.11 (1975) (pointing out that Title
VII was modeled after the National Labor Relations Act, which does not permit puni-
tive damages); Reid v. Memphis Pub. Co., 369 F. Supp. 684, 690 (W.D. Tenn. 1973),
affld in part on other grounds, rev'd in part on other grounds, 521 F.2d 512 (6th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976); see also B. SCHrLE1 & P. GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1452 & nn. 153-56 (1983) (the reader is re-
ferred to cases cited therein). But see Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 401 F. Supp.
1022, 1026 (E.D. La. 1975), affd in part, vacated in part, 583 F.2d 143 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979) ("[Plunitive damages would further the aims
of Title VII by deterring violations and by encouraging plaintiffs to seek relief by in-
creasing their recovery . . ... "); Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co.,
369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir.
1974) (awarding damages under Title VII for mental anguish and loss of job experi-
ence). In addition, some federal courts of appeal have suggested that an award of nomi-
nal damages accompany attorney's fees. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 253 n.1 (4th
Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905-06 & n.12 (11th Cir. 1982);
Joshi v. Florida State Univ., 646 F.2d 981, 991 & n.33 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 972 (1982).
7' See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419-21 (1975)
(backpay awarded to make the employee whole).
76 See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 948 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recom-
mending to the district court appropriate language for injunctive relief).
77 See, e.g., Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 542 F. Supp. 123, 128 (W.D. Tenn. 1981),
affd, 752 F.2d 1070 (6th Cir. 1984) (enjoining corporate agents and employees from
making sexually insulting remarks to female workers); see also Bundy, 641 F.2d at 946
n.12 (pointing out that reinstatement and backpay are "irrelevant" to a case of intangi-
ble harassment).
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B. The Inadequacy of Title VII
Federal law provides important remedies aimed at the elimination
of employment discrimination. Title VII alone, however, does not ade-
quately combat the devastating effect of sexual harassment on the indi-
vidual worker. The limits that the statute imposes on liability com-
pletely bar relief in many instances where severe harassment has
occurred. For example, because the statute applies only to employers
with fifteen or more employees,78 a victim of harassment in a smaller
commercial enterprise receives no protection under federal antidis-
crimination law.
Even when a court does find an employer liable for harassment,
Title VII's remedies are often inadequate. A plaintiff cannot rely on
the statute's equitable relief provisions to compensate her for lost earn-
ing capacity or for nonpecuniary harm such as severe emotional distress
or physical injury.79 Moreover, if an employee prevails in a lawsuit, the
work environment may become so hostile and debilitating, and relations
with coworkers or supervisors so strained, that an injunction or rein-
statement under Title VII would be unwanted and perhaps counter-
productive.8" Finally, although a major objective of Title VII is to pre-
vent future employment discrimination,8" punitive damages-a
powerful economic deterrent-are unavailable no matter how malicious
or harmful the harassment may have been.2 Title VII correctly treats
harassment as discrimination but fails to address the full impact of such
conduct on the individual worker.
The severe personal harm that sexual harassment often inflicts
demonstrates the need for the kind of relief provided in tort law. As one
78 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b) (1982) (defining "employer" for purposes of stat-
ute). See supra note 41.
7' See supra note 74 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 12, at 107
(noting that no compensatory relief is available for coworker harassment).
80 See Andrews, supra note 4, at 142-43:
The effectiveness [of an injunction prohibiting sexual harassment] . . . is
questionable. It is suggested that plaintiffs and defendants are not usually
the "best of friends" after a lawsuit. But rather, after the termination of a
lawsuit, plaintiffs and defendants express hostility towards one an-
other .... This type of employment atmosphere would seem to facilitate
verbal abuse or possibly some other retaliatory action. ...
Compensation for sexual harassment should conform to the realities
of the situation. It may be unreasonable to expect a sexually harassed vic-
tim to return to a job at which she experienced sexual harassment.
81 See supra text accompanying note 72.
82 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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court observed, Title VII's equitable remedies
fail to capture the personal nature of the injury done to a
wrongfully discharged employe [sic] as an individual and the
remedies provided by the statutes fail to appreciate the rele-
vant dimensions of the problem. Reinstatement, backpay and
injunctions vindicate the rights of the victimized group with-
out compensating the plaintiff for such personal injuries as
anguish, physical symptoms of stress, a sense of degradation,
and the cost of psychiatric care. Legal, as well as equitable
remedies are needed to make the plaintiff whole.8 3
III. THE INADEQUACY OF TRADITIONAL TORT LAW
Tort law may be able to provide more complete recovery when the
harm inflicted by sexual harassment requires relief beyond the scope of
Title VII. Compensatory damages for pain and suffering traditionally
are awarded for "virtually any form of conscious suffering, both mental
and physical." 4 Relief for the invasion of a dignitary interest is also
available under such rubrics as assault, battery, and outrage; these the-
ories recognize the wrong as a damage in and of itself.8" Special dam-
ages may also be recovered for loss of time, reputation, and emotional
peace.' In addition, tort law could provide a stronger deterrent in the
form of punitive or exemplary damages. Such an award usually is
based on the defendant's "culpable state of mind," so that proof of ma-
licious conduct would justify imposing punitive damages on the em-
ployer.8 7 Some courts, however, have also awarded punitive damages
when the actor has clearly abused a position of power, even if no guilty
motive can be shown.88 As a supplement to Title VII, a tort theory of
8 Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 298 Or. 76, 97, 689 P.2d 1292, 1303-04
(1984) (reversing dismissal of common law claim of wrongful discharge); see also An-
drews, supra note 4, at 147-48 (Because a victim's psychological and physical suffering
does not constitute economic loss within the scope of Title VII's equitable relief, the
statute fails to consider the mental anguish and outrageousness of workplace
harassment.).
8 D. DOBBS, supra note 73, § 8.1, at 544. Dobbs notes, however, that "substan-
tive law may exclude recovery for mental pain in limited circumstances," as it might in
an instance where there is no physical impact. Id. at 544-45.
" See id. § 7.3, at 530-31; see also Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). If the plaintiff's harm is a legal injury, "the elements for
demanding redress exist, since already the value of mental suffering, caused by an act
wrongful in itself, is recognized as a basis for compensation." Id. at 213.
86 See D. DOBBS, supra note 73, § 7.3, at 531.
87 Id. § 3.9, at 206.
8 See id. § 3.9, at 206-07 nn.14-21 (the reader is referred to cases cited therein).
Allowance of punitive damages on the basis of this special kind of conduct
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recovery would offer a form of relief directly applicable to the personal
impact of sexual harassment."9
Despite the need for relief for sexual harassment, the traditional
theories of recovery in tort are ill-suited to the personal harm that re-
sults from workplace harassment. A fundamental reason for this inade-
quacy is that only in recent years has harassment been recognized as a
legally actionable wrong. Tort law cannot provide a precedent for a
legal approach to sexual harassment in modern society because tradi-
tional theories simply do not conform conceptually "to the social reality
of men's sexual treatment of women. . . .Although the facts of sex
discrimination have a long history in women's suffering, the prohibition
on sex discrimination as such lacks a common-law history."90
Consequently, traditional tort theories continue to produce unsatis-
fying results when courts attempt to find grounds on which to grant
relief. Although some theories have enabled victims to recover for their
injuries, doctrinal restrictions have severely limited the possibility of
finding a basis for liability in tort. A survey of commonly used theories
demonstrates the inadequacies of each, especially in the absence of a
termination of employment or the infliction of physical harm. 1
rather than on the basis of the defendant's mental state, would be entirely
consistent with the idea that punitive awards should serve the purpose of
encouraging suit by the plaintiff as a "private attorney general" on issues
of special importance.
Id. § 3.9, at 207.
89 See Shaffer v. National Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (recog-
nizing that a tort claim was necessary to supplement the state antidiscrimination stat-
ute, which generally provided an exclusive remedy when invoked). Injunctions, rein-
statement, and backpay further the government's interest in "eradicating targeted forms
of discrimination." Id. at 914. In contrast, "[t]he tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress vindicates the personal interest of freedom from intentionally imposed
mental anguish. Damages, both compensatory and punitive, provide the remedy for this
wrong." Id.
It has been argued that a common law action against an employer should be con-
sidered an alternative, rather than a supplement, to a Title VII claim. See, e.g., Wald,
Alternatives to Title VII: State Statutory and Common-Law Remedies for Employment
Discrimination, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 38-40, 44-46 (1982) (arguing that admin-
istrative delays, narrow statutory relief, and growing restrictions in judicial interpreta-
tions of Title VII render state claims potentially more successful than pendent or sepa-
rate claims under state and federal law). The specific problems of pendent jurisdiction,
state statutory preclusion, and administrative complexities will not be addressed in this
Comment.
9' C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 161; see also supra note 35 (discussing early
tort cases of sexual harassment).
91 Other theories of recovery that may provide the basis for a harassment claim
include defamation, fraud or misrepresentation, and wrongful discharge. These torts,
which have a very limited scope, will not be addressed in this Comment.
[Vol. 134:1461
TORT LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. Assault and Battery
Liability for assault requires a showing that (1) the actor intended
to cause harmful or offensive physical contact, and (2) the victim was
put in apprehension of such conduct. 2 This theory is intended to pro-
tect an individual's right to be free from "apprehension of a harmful or
offensive contact"; any act that creates such apprehension is a tortious
assault, even in the absence of physical contact.9" Verbal abuse gener-
ally is not actionable unless other conduct or circumstances can be
shown to have caused "reasonable apprehension" of imminent
contact.
94
Battery consists of a harmful or offensive contact that is offensively
caused. 5 Liability requires a showing of intent to touch but not neces-
sarily to harm. Thus, regardless of the actor's specific purpose, battery
may involve offensive, insulting, or physically harmful contact. Since
apprehension of unwanted physical contact often accompanies the ac-
tual touching, a plaintiff frequently may bring an action under claims
of both assault and battery.
In the context of sexual harassment, these two theories are useful
as long as the victim has either experienced or expected offensive or
harmful physical contact.98 For example, in Skousen v. Nidy, 97 a sixty-
five year old caretaker in a trailer park prevailed in a suit against her
employer for assault and battery. The park owner repeatedly had at-
tempted to seduce the woman by touching her in a sexual manner and,
on several occasions, assaulting her violently.9" Recognizing the need to
provide relief for both the mental and physical consequences of the em-
ployer's conduct, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld an award of com-
pensatory and punitive damages. 9
92 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965); see also Rogers v. Loews
L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523, 529 (D.D.C. 1981) (sexual harassment case
relying on Restatement to define assault and battery).
" See Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F.
Supp. 993, 1012 (S.D. Tex. 1981) ("It is an assault to hold a weapon in a threatening
position, or to surround an individual with a display of force.") (citing W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 10 (4th ed. 1971)).
9' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 31 (1965); see e.g., Johnson v.
G.M. Acceptance Corp., 228 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1955) (per curiam) (abusive and in-
sulting language not actionable).
95 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965); see also C. MAc-
KINNON, supra note 1, at 165 (unwanted sexual touching historically considered tor-
tious as battery, assault, or infliction of emotional distress).
96 See Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523, 529 (D.D.C.
1981); C. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 165.
97 90 Ariz. 215, 367 P.2d 248 (1961).
" See id. at 216-17, 367 P.2d at 249.
99 See id. at 219, 367 P.2d at 250.
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Unless the harassment involves at least a threat of imminent phys-
ical touching, however, the theories of assault and battery cannot pro-
vide a basis for liability. Consequently, these doctrines are useless when
the alleged harassment consists, for example, of a daily barrage of sex-
ual insults, although the worker suffers severe mental anguish. Fur-
thermore, no liability exists on these grounds even if the employee is
threatened with termination of employment. When a hostile work envi-
ronment or a demand for sexual favors lacks an explicit physical threat,
a different theory of recovery is necessary.
B. Intrusion
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the tort of intrusion is
defined as an encroachment, "physically or otherwise, upon the solitude
or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns . . . if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."10 0 Despite
the broad language of the Restatement, some courts narrowly define
intrusion in physical terms, similar to trespass. So construed, recogni-
tion of the tort is "directed to protecting the integrity and sanctity of
physical areas a person would naturally consider private and off limits
to uninvited, unwelcomed, prying persons."' '
In Cummings v. Walsh Construction Co.,102 the trial court dis-
missed an intrusion claim in which a female worker employed by the
construction company alleged that a plant foreman had intimidated her
into having sexual relations with him.10 3 Under Georgia law, liability
for intrusion required proof that the defendant's conduct was "un-
wanted, uninvited, and unwarranted. '10 4 Since Walsh did not physi-
cally resist her supervisor's advances, the court determined that she was
willing to have sex with him: "It is plain that plaintiff had other
courses of action but that she did not avail herself of them. . . . [She]
had the alternative of outright refusal. She did not choose that path,
and in so doing, waived whatever right she had as to her personal se-
clusion or solitude."1 0 5 The court did not consider the possibility that
Walsh may have been economically coerced into having sex with her
supervisor. Apparently the implicit threat of termination of employ-
ment, which unquestionably accompanied the foreman's demands, did
100 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1965).
10 Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 884 (S.D. Ga. 1983)
(emphasis added).
102 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
103 See id. at 876.
104 Id. at 884.
105 Id.
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not suggest that the "sexual encounter" was genuinely "unwanted, un-
invited and unwarranted." ' 6
In contrast to the narrow approach in Cummings, other courts
have expanded the scope of intrusion to compensate harassment victims
even when no physical violation has occurred. In Rogers v. Loews
L'Enfant Plaza Hotel,10 7 an assistant manager at a hotel restaurant
claimed that her supervisor had committed intrusion by frequently
telephoning her at home to make sexual advances and to comment
about her personal life.108 The court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs
claim because of her additional allegations of discrimination and other
tortious behavior by her supervisor: "[I]n this particular situation, with
allegations of sexual harassment in personal, as well as professional
life, . . . the pleadings are sufficient to indicate an intrusion into a
sphere from which plaintiff Rogers could reasonably expect [her super-
visor] should be excluded. 1 0 9
Two years later, the Alabama Supreme Court extended the defini-
tion of intrusion to include an employer's invasion of an employee's
right to psychological-not merely physical-solitude. In Phillips v.
Smalley Maintenance Services,'" the court found that the employer's
continual interrogations about his employee's sex life and his frequent
demands for sex had caused the woman to suffer from chronic anxiety,
to contemplate suicide, and to require counseling and medication.1
Noting that "[o]ne's emotional sanctum is certainly due the same expec-
tations of privacy as one's physical environment," ' 2 the court upheld
an award of compensatory damages for the woman's medical costs, as
well as for her mental anguish.
The Rogers and Phillips decisions demonstrate the flexibility with
which one may interpret the scope of intrusive invasion of privacy. In
view of the clear need to provide compensation for the victim's pecuni-
ary and emotional harm, the two courts deliberately extended the scope
of intrusion beyond its traditional limits in order to find the employers
liable for harassment. Whether these cases will establish a new prece-
dent in the interpretation of tort law remains unclear. Furthermore,
even if other jurisdictions broaden the scope of intrusion, the extent to
which courts will relax the traditional requirements is unpredictable.
Finally, some forms of harassment, such as severe intimidation and de-
106 Id.
10 526 F. Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981).
108 See id. at 525-26.
109 Id. at 528.
110 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983).
"I See id. at 708.
112 Id. at 711.
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liberate humiliation, could never fall within the rubric of invasion of
privacy, if they occur only within the workplace and are limited to top-
ics about which the individual has no expectation of privacy. Although
the Rogers and Phillips decisions may heighten the chances of recovery
for some plaintiffs, they do not establish a reliable precedent for all
victims of workplace harassment.
C. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations
Interference with an employment contract occurs when "one inten-
tionally acts to deprive another of an economic benefit." '113 Upon proof
of (1) actual interference with an employment relationship, and (2) ma-
licious state of mind, a plaintiff may be entitled to both compensatory
and punitive damages.11 4 A coworker who is ordered to pay punitive
damages may not seek indemnification from the employer; thus, the
deterrent purpose of punitive damages is advanced by placing a finan-
cial burden directly upon the person who engages in harassing
conduct.11 5
Unfortunately, however, an action based on this theory is available
only under very limited circumstances: the plaintiff cannot be an em-
ployee-at-will, 16 a claim may only be brought against a third party
who allegedly interfered with the employment relationship,11 and the
interfering party's conduct must affect an economic benefit.1 8 As a re-
sult, this theory neither imposes liability on an employer 1 9 nor enables
a plaintiff to recover for mental anguish. 2
113 Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 950 (D.N.J. 1978).
114 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 766 (1965): "One who intention-
ally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract . .. between another
and a third person by . . . causing the third person not to perform the contract, is
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting ....
115 See Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 476 F. Supp. 335, 341 (D.N.J. 1979) (pro-
ceeding to determine damages).
110 See Cummings, 561 F. Supp. at 883.
117 See id.
118 See Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 950 (D.N.J. 1978).
219 Employer liability is desirable because employers often "tacitly encourage[]
[sexual harassment] by deliberately choosing to overlook it," and thus bear significant
responsibility for failing to monitor and control the workplace. Id. at 950. Further-
more, the employer, perceived as a deep pocket, may be the only individual who can
provide effective compensation for the aggrieved victim.
120 Damages for mental distress are also barred in actions for breach of contract.
See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (finding
unlawful termination of employment in retaliation against plaintiff for her refusal to
date employer). Although the employer had acted maliciously, the court refused to sus-
tain an award for mental suffering. Id. at 134, 316 A.2d at 552.
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D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Of all the theories of recovery available to a harassment victim, the
tort of outrage-the intentional infliction of emotional distress-may be
the most successful ground on which to recover for mental harm. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the tort of outrage as follows:
"One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or reck-
lessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability
for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from
it, for such bodily harm .,,21
For a victim of workplace harassment, this theory of liability pro-
vides a particularly strong basis for recovering money damages. The
fact that the tort is defined in terms of the actor's conduct virtually
ensures an award of punitive damages, which serves as a vital deterrent
and provides more complete compensation for the victim.122 In addition,
under the notion of "parasitic damages" an employer becomes liable for
all the consequences of his behavior; thus, a successful claim under this
theory may allow a plaintiff to recover for all the direct and indirect
effects of sexual harassment."2 '
The absence of a clear definition of outrageous conduct poses the
greatest obstacle to recovery under this theory. In contrast to the defini-
tions of other intentional and dignitary harms such as assault, battery,
libel, and false imprisonment, the term "outrage" does not refer to a
specific type of behavior. 12 The Restatement and its comments offer an
extremely vague standard for judicial evaluation of harassment claims:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
121 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
123 Givelber points out:
The tort of outrageousness furthers the goals typically associated with the
doctrine of punitive damages: (1) punishment of the defendant both as a
deterrent to future misdeeds by the defendant and as ethical retribution
against the defendant for social transgressions, (2) deterrence of others
through the example made of defendant, (3) law enforcement in the sense
of providing encouragement of the plaintiff to sue to redress societal
wrongs, (4) complete compensation of the plaintiff through the provision
of additional funds with which to pay the attorney, and (5) a reaffirmation
of societal values.
Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 CoLuM. L.
REv. 42, 54 n.63 (1982).
123 See C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 167.
124 See Givelber, supra note 122, at 51-52.
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Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts
to an average member of the community would arouse his
resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
"Outrageous!
1
1
25
As a flagrant violation of public policy, sexual harassment should
be recognized as outrageous per se. The Restatement explains that
"[t]he extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from
an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which
gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to af-
fect his interests." '26 Sexual harassment provides a mechanism for eco-
nomic coercion in the employment context.'27 Federal antidiscrimina-
tion law demonstrates government intolerance for this infringement on
civil rights. Thus, the severe misuse of power inherent in sexual harass-
ment justifies a finding of outrageousness.
The threat of economic coercion in sexual harassment, viewed as a
consequence of the inequality inherent in the employment relationship,
has in fact led several courts to sustain sexual harassment claims under
the tort of outrage.128 In these cases, the abuse of power that is unique
to sexual harassment distinguishes a plaintiff's allegations from other
situations of oppression in the workplace.1 2 For example, the Cum-
mings court determined that an employee-at-will could bring a claim of
outrageous conduct even if she was barred from alleging wrongful dis-
charge, because an employer may never act beyond the scope of author-
ity: "[I]t may have been within the power of defendant to fire plaintiff
regardless of the reason, but [diefendant does not have the authority to
intentionally injure her emotionally."
1 3 0
12I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965). In response,
Givelber remarks: "Outrageous conduct, these comments tell us, is conduct that is out-
rageous." Givelber, supra note 122, at 53.
128 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment e (1965).
127 See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
128 See, e.g., Shaffer v. National Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(employer's creation of an oppressive workplace atmosphere caused severe emotional
distress); Vegh v. General Elec. Co., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 135 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (allegations of unwanted sexual advances, verbal and physical conduct sufficient
to establish claim for relief); Rogers, 526 F. Supp. 523 (abusive language and physical
advances from a direct supervisor); Rice v. United Ins. Co. of America, 465 So. 2d
1100 (Ala. 1984) (pattern of outrageous acts by employer and supervisor sufficient to
support claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Howard Univ. v. Best, 484
A.2d 958 (D.C. 1984) (allegations of sexual harassment by dean stated a cause of ac-
tion for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
12 See, e.g., Cummings, 561 F. Supp. at 882; Rogers, 526 F. Supp. at 531; How-
ard Univ., 484 A.2d at 977.
130 Cummings, 561 F. Supp. at 882.
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In Howard University v. Best,1"1 a female professor whose con-
tract had not been renewed alleged that a male dean's sexual advances
and deliberate creation of a hostile work environment not only had re-
sulted in her termination of employment but also had caused her to
develop hypertension and to require counseling." 2 The District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals, upholding the plaintiff's tort claim, focused
in particular on the close relationship between outrageous conduct and
the violation of public policy:
Recognizing that women suffer sexual harassment in the
workplace, based on outmoded sexual stereotypes and male
domination of subordinate female employees, we reject the
view, articulated by the trial court, that, as a matter of law,
the degrading and humiliating behavior herein detailed was
at worse a "social impropriety" which did not amount to the
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 33
As these cases suggest, sexual harassment in the workplace should be
regarded as outrageous because such behavior is an unacceptable abuse
of power. In practice, however, most courts decide on a case-by-case
basis what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct. Consequently,
recovery under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress
depends on a jurisdiction's standards, rather than on a recognition of
the inherently coercive nature of the conduct.
Recent decisions reveal inconsistent attitudes regarding the severity
of sexual harassment. As discussed above, some claims of outrage have
survived preliminary motions.1" In other jurisdictions, however, similar
claims have been either withdrawn or dismissed as a matter of law.
13 5
In Hooten v. Pennsylvania College of Optometry,"8' for example, the
plaintiff claimed that her coworkers constantly had made disparaging
remarks to her about her marital status and new role as a mother.
They deliberately overloaded her work schedule, forcing her to commit
errors and suffer professional embarrassment. When she collapsed one
day at work no supervisor came to her aid; she was ultimately dis-
131 484 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1984).
132 Id. at 982.
133 Id. at 986. The court pointed out that "the elimination of discrimination
within the District of Columbia should have 'the highest priority.'" Id. (quoting RE-
PORT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE DIsTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
SERVICES AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, July 5, 1977, at 3).
134 See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
13l See, e.g., Guyette v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 521 (D.N.J. 1981)
(claim withdrawn before final judgment); Hooten v. Pennsylvania College of Optome-
try, 601 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (claim dismissed by court).
's" 601 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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charged from her position.13 7 The court decided that, as a matter of
law, no jury could construe such conduct to be outrageous. The court
stated that to survive a motion for dismissal a claim required allega-
tions of: (1) direct sexual advances, (2) threats of retribution, (3) un-
consented physical contact, or (4) sexual references about the employee
to other workers." 8 In apparent disregard for the coercive nature of the
coworkers' conduct and employer's implicit consent, the court stated:
While in no way do we wish to mitigate any of the pain and
humiliation plaintiff may have suffered, the court does not
believe that the alleged conduct . . . [rose] to the level that
was so outrageous that it went beyond all bounds of de-
cency. . . . While creating an environment which is oppres-
sive to function within is likely to cause distress it is not the
type of action to arouse resentment, by the average member
of the community, against the actor.1 9
Thus, the possibility of recovery under this rubric remains uncer-
tain. As one writer observed: "[T]he vitality of this cause of action de-
pends almost entirely on the judicial sensitivity to the true nature of
sexual harassment. 1 40 Unless courts fully comprehend the powerful el-
ement of coercion in the employment context, it is doubtful that the tort
of outrage will provide a reliable basis for relief. A second possible rea-
son for judicial reluctance to extend the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress beyond its narrow confines may be the concern that a
broad definition would create a "flood of litigation. 1 41 Courts may
agree that harassment is indeed outrageous but fear that allowing many
different kinds of behavior to be actionable would clog the dockets."42
Therefore, sexual harassment may not fall within the specific rubric of
outrage, but courts may be willing to recognize an independent cause of
action for such conduct.
Current tort law thus fails to address the severe personal harm
inflicted upon victims of sexual harassment. No single rubric provides
137 See id. at 1153.
138 See id. at 1154.
119 Id. at 1154-55.
140 Note, Legal Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual Harassment, 64
MINN. L. REV. 151, 172 (1979).
141 W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 23 (5th ed. 1984) (The editors state that the courts "always
have stood more or less in dread" of such an increase in actions.).
142 See id. at 23-24. "But this is a poor reason for denying recovery for any genu-
ine, serious mental injury. It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it
... and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to
deny relief on such grounds." Id. § 12, at 56.
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adequate relief. Even if a worker brought multiple claims against her
employer, such a lawsuit would not guarantee complete recovery. The
main difficulty with tort law is finding liability at all, under any the-
ory. Although a combination of claims might maximize the kinds of
remedies available to a plaintiff, it would prove useless if the employer
could not be held liable in the first place. In its present form, therefore,
tort law does not provide a satisfactory basis for relief for sexual
harassment.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW TORT: SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IN THE WORKPLACE
In creating a debilitating and hostile work environment, sexual
harassment inflicts considerable harm on the victim, ranging from
physical injury and lost earning capacity to severe emotional distress
and other psychological damage. As argued above, neither Title VII
nor traditional tort theory afford harassment victims an adequate basis
of recovery. The insufficiency of current federal statutory law and state
common law demonstrates the importance of establishing a credible
theory of liability and a basis for complete legal relief. By deliberately
extending the scope of certain torts and criticizing the law's failure to
provide recovery in cases of severe injury, several courts apparently
have recognized the need to address sexual harassment as a cause of
action apart from a civil rights violation.143 An independent theory of
liability would provide an adequate remedy for the harm suffered by
individual employees.
A. Elements of the Proposed Cause of Action
1. Definition of Harassment
For purposes of this proposed theory of recovery, sexual harass-
ment is defined according to the E.E.O.C. Guidelines."" As discussed
in Part I, this definition encompasses a broad range of conduct.1 45 The
key element is an unreasonable interference with an individual em-
143 See supra notes 84-142 and accompanying text.
.44 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1986). See supra text accompanying note 43. In a re-
cent case in Pennsylvania, the plaintiffs attorney relied on the E.E.O.C. Guidelines'
definition for a common-law claim of sexual harassment. The claim survived prelimi-
nary motions but, because the case was eventually settled out of court, the theory was
never fully tested. See Dorfsman v. C.B.S., No. 84-4634 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1984)
(claims against coworker for sexual harassment and against employer for ratifying and
negligently hiring individual defendant).
'" See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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ployee's right to work in an environment free from sex-based intimida-
tion or hostility.
2. Reasonable Woman Standard
Recovery under this theory, as under other theories of dignitary
harm, should include both compensatory and punitive damages for all
harm proximately resulting from the actor's conduct. To measure a
plaintiff's injury and, therefore, the extent of her recovery, a court
should apply a "reasonable woman" standard.
A reasonableness standard generally applies to all intentional torts
involving emotional harm. For example, recovery under the tort of out-
rage, which permits relief for emotional distress without accompanying
physical injury, requires that the defendant's conduct be outrageous "to
a person of ordinary sensibilities."14 In the context of sexual harass-
ment, however, applying a completely objective standard of reasonable-
ness would fail to account for the unequal relationship between the
sexes, which gives rise to harassment in the first place:
Sex is peculiarly an area where a presumption of gender
sameness, or judgments by men of women, are not illuminat-
ing as standards for equal treatment, since to remind a man
of his sexuality is to build his sense of potency, while for a
man to remind a woman of hers is often experienced as in-
trusive, denigrating, and depotentiating. Making an issue of
skin color does not have the same social meaning for blacks
as for whites. A corrective "ordinary woman" standard
would need to be applied to tort analogies in the discrimina-
tion context.
1 47
Courts frequently -rely on a subjective standard to determine the
extent of liability and damages in other areas of law. Liability for as-
sault, for example, is established by what the defendant's behavior "de-
note[d] at the time to the party assaulted."'1 48 In discrimination cases,
the E.E.O.C. Guidelines direct the court to consider "the record as a
whole and . . . the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of
146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965).
147 C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 171; see also Goodman, supra note 1, at
467 (conduct that men find "humorous and innocuous" may be "serious and menacing"
to women).
1148 0. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 167 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 41 (1941)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 27
comment a, at 42 (1965) (stating that even "abnormally sensitive" plaintiffs can recover
for assault in some circumstances).
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the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred."1 49
From the perspective of discrimination law, women and minorities
are subjected to a hostile or offensive work environment precisely be-
cause they belong to a group that is viewed by society as inferior. Con-
sequently, the race and sex of the harassment victim must be a substan-
tial consideration in evaluating the effect of the defendant's conduct on
the plaintiff. For example, when a cosmetic company referred to all its
female employees as "girls," a federal court held the company liable for
two offenses: sex discrimination against all the women and race dis-
crimination against the black women in particular.150 The court evalu-
ated the company's conduct according to its effect on "ordinary black
women":
To be addressed as "girl" is inherently more offensive to Ne-
groes than to Caucasians because of the repellant historical
images the term understandably evokes. Thus, even though
Negro and Caucasian employees are called 'girls' with equal
frequency and no discriminatory intent, there will nonethe-
less be a foreseeable disparate effect.'
A compelling example of a reasonable woman standard also ap-
peared in a murder case, in which the court established the standard by
which a claim of self-defense should be judged. In State v. Wanrow,5 2
the Arizona Supreme Court reversed a conviction for first-degree mur-
der, because the trial court's jury instructions regarding self-defense
had erroneously held the female defendant to an objective standard of
reasonableness. This misleading standard, which was effectually
designed for a confrontation between two men, "constitute[d] a separate
and distinct misstatement of the law and, in the context of this case,
violate[d] the defendant's right to equal protection of the law." 5 ' The
jury should have considered the effects of society's "long and unfortu-
nate history of sex discrimination"' " when it evaluated the woman's
conduct and perceptions of danger: "Until such time as the effects of
that history are eradicated, care must be taken to assure that our self-
defense instructions afford women to have their conduct judged in light
of the individual physical handicaps which were the product of sex dis-
.49 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1986).
160 See 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 441 (1971).
15 Id.
152 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
1153 Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 558-59.
154 Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 559 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684
(1973)).
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crimination."1 5 In a harassment action against an employer, the ordi-
nary woman standard would require the trier of fact to- evaluate the
effect of the harasser's conduct on a reasonable woman. For example,
an office worker may allege that her employer constantly pinched and
grabbed her in the presence of coworkers. The male employees might
be unable to perceive that such conduct creates a humiliating and in-
timidating working environment. Nevertheless, the court should hold
the employer liable for harassment, because his behavior is likely to be
offensive to the average female employee.
The ordinary woman standard would not impose an unfair double
standard on conduct in the workplace. If all employees were bound by
a gender-neutral standard, the judge would have insufficient guidance
on the question of harassment's effects on women. A standard that sup-
posedly treats men and women the same begs the question: "The same
as whom?"1 L56 Under the standard proposed here, the impact of sexual
harassment would be properly judged in the context of a society encum-
bered by a long history of employment discrimination.
B. Employer Liability
This tort theory would impose an affirmative duty on an employer
to prevent and eliminate sexual harassment in the workplace. The em-
ployer is "clearly in the best position" to end any form of employment
discrimination.1 57 Employers can control *the behavior of employees
and, indeed, the entire working environment. In an effort to end har-
assment, employers can implement internal measures, such as an em-
ployment policy against harassment and a disciplinary procedure for
violations.1 58
Employees must depend on harassment-free working conditions,
both for their emotional well-being and for their productivity. More-
over, to maintain an efficient and profitable business, the employer
must recognize the economic importance of eliminating any form of em-
155 Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 559.
156 C. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 174. This proposal of a "reasonable wo-
man" standard does not imply that only women are subject to sexual harassment.
When appropriate, a "reasonable man" standard should be used for a male plaintiff.
157 Vermeulen, supra note 2, at 292; see also Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of
Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1449, 1462 (1984)
(arguing 'that employers are "in the best position to review and evaluate supervisors'
conduct"); Note, supra note 12, at 102 (arguing in favor of placing liability "on the
party most able to control the work environment and to compensate the victims of sex-
ual harassment").
I" See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0 (1986) (suggesting various preventive measures).
"Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment." Id.
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ployment discrimination.1 59 The employer's duty under Title VII to
refrain from discrimination has been extended, as a practical matter, to
include the affirmative duty to investigate and remedy complaints of
sexual harassment from employees.180 Ultimately, the obligation to pre-
vent and remedy harassment is justified by the extent to which an em-
ployer controls the work environment.""
The importance of eradicating employment discrimination and the
fact that an employer is in the best position to eliminate sexual harass-
ment point to the desirability of holding an employer strictly liable for
all harassment in the workplace. If sexual harassment was viewed as
occurring within the scope, of employment, the doctrine of respondeat
superior would justify imposing vicarious liability on the employer for
acts of the victim's coworkers." 2 Under the agency theory of liability,
the conduct of supervisors could be directly imputed to the employer,
although a principal's liability for an agent's actions generally requires
at least implicit ratification of the conduct at issue.' The concept of
equitable estoppel, however, could justify liability for harassment by a
supervisor even absent employer knowledge or consent. An employer
derives benefits from delegating to supervisors the authority to control
employees; thus, the employer should be liable for all acts of supervi-
sors when they abuse their positions of authority.'" These considera-
tions of fairness and public policy present a persuasive argument in
favor of imposing a strict liability standard on the employer.
'-" See Vermeulen, supra note 2, at 291.
1eo See Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D. Mich.
1977) (employer could be liable for supporting a supervisor's dismissal of a female
employee without investigating her harassment complaint).
161 See M. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT 8 (1977) ("[P]ower gives control, which
in turn confers duty, the breach of which is conventionally described as negli-
gence. . . . [T]he use of the negligence label in such a case stands for a judgment that
there has been a compensable default in the control of power."). Although Shapo spe-
cifically refers to an employer's duty to ensure the physical safety of workers, the rela-
tionship between power and duty applies directly to sexual harassment; in fact, an
employer is probably better able to prevent or eliminate harassment than to eliminate
the risk of other kinds of harm, especially accidental physical injury.
162 Respondeat superior is a doctrine of strict liability imposed on a master for the
unauthorized torts of her servant if committed while the servant is acting within the
scope of employment. H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, AGENCY & PARTNERSHIP
§ 52 (1979).
162 See id. at § 32.
16 See Farley, Sexual Harassment: Critical Review of Legal Cases with General
Principles and Preventive Measures, Paper No. 785, INsTrrTE FOR RESEARCH IN
THE BEHAVIORAL, ECONOMIC AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCES 14-15 (Jan. 1982); see
also Note, supra note 157, at 1461 (arguing that a supervisor empowered to hire and
fire is effectually an agent for the employer).
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1. Workers' Compensation as a Barrier to Tort Actions
The major obstacle to holding an employer strictly liable for sex-
ual harassment is the workers' compensation system. In implying that
harassment arises out of, and in the course of, employment, a strict
liability standard invokes the workers' compensation statutes, which bar
most tort actions by a worker against her employer.
The general philosophy and distribution of benefits under work-
ers' compensation differ considerably from those of tort law. The pri-
mary objective of a tort theory is to redress wrongs that have caused
harm. Liability generally depends on fault, and an award of damages is
intended to compensate the victim for her loss. In contrast, the workers'
compensation laws of a given state provide an economic insurance sys-
tem for employees. 165 Liability depends on the extent to which the in-
jury is related to work; the personal fault of an employer or supervisor
becomes irrelevant.16 A specific formula based on the individual's
earning capacity determines the amount of damages.1"'
The scope of injuries covered by workers' compensation varies
from state to state. Only two states have enacted legislation that specifi-
cally addresses nonphysical harm. 68 Several other states have adopted
the cumulative action system, whereby a plaintiff is permitted to bring
both tort and no-fault claims. 69 After the claims are settled, the no-
fault benefits are set off against the damages awarded in the tort action
to avoid a windfall recovery. Such a system proves especially useful for
sexual harassment claims, which often include both physical and
mental harm.1 70 Recovery under this system, however, requires proof of
16 See A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws, § 2.10 (1985); see also
Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort Actions,
10 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 879, 908 (1980).
16 See A. LARSON, supra note 165, at § 2.10.
167 See id. § 2.50.
168 Those two states are Wisconsin and California. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208-
3208.1 (West 1986) (compensable injuries include nonphysical stress or strain caused
by one work-related incident or a series of such incidents); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.01(c) (West 1986) (definition of injury includes "mental harm or emotional
stress or strain without physical trauma").
169 See OR. REV. STAT. § 656.156(2) (1985); WASH REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5124.020 (1986); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(b) (1985).
171 Under the cumulative action system, a harassment victim could receive no-fault
benefits for physical and mental harm affecting her earning capacity, along with court-
awarded compensation for medical costs, pain and suffering, and possibly punitive
damages. Her no-failt benefits then would be subtracted from the amount awarded in
her tort judgment. See Love, Actions for Non-Physical Harm: The Relationship Be-
tween the Tort System and No-Fault Compensation (With an Emphasis on Workers'
Compensation), 73 CALIF. L. REV. 857, 860-61 (1985) (discussion includes a hypothet-
ical distinguishing theories of no-fault recovery).
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specific intent; no plaintiff has ever succeeded in a claim for purely
nonphysical harm.171 Several other states have adopted some form of an
alternative action system in which legislative guidelines determine the
plaintiff's avenue of relief.172 For the most part, however, no-fault com-
pensation laws contain exclusive remedy provisions that preclude most
tort actions by an employee against her employer.173 In fact, no-fault
coverage recently has been expanded to include many kinds of emo-
tional and mental harm.
1 74
The scope of workers' compensation becomes a crucial factor in
determining an appropriate standard of employer liability for sexual
harassment. To hold an employer strictly liable would imply that har-
assment occurred within the scope of employment. This job-related
harm would be covered by workers' compensation, which would then
serve to bar a tort action against the employer. Thus, a strict liability
standard would become self-defeating when applied to sexual harass-
ment in the workplace.
2. Liability Outside Workers' Compensation
To permit an action against an employer, courts must exclude sex-
ual harassment from the coverage of workers' compensation. The courts
could generally classify harassment as an injury outside the contempla-
tion of the no-fault system. In addition, one may argue that harassment
does not "arise out of" employment for the purposes of the statutes. In
this context, a standard of constructive knowledge would impose direct
liability on an employer who failed to prevent or eliminate sexual har-
assment in the workplace.
In some jurisdictions, no-fault compensation statutes specifically
deny benefits for injuries involving no job disability, 75 harm indepen-
dent of an industrial injury, 7 harm caused by a specific and nonphysi-
cal stimulus,1 77 or intentional torts.'78 Depending on the jurisdiction
1' See id. at 861-62.
17 See id. at 864-68.
173 Some courts interpret the exclusive remedy clauses literally; most, however,
have created exceptions. See id at 868-69.
174 See id. at 871-73.
175 See, e.g., Moll v. Parkside Livonia Credit Union, 525 F. Supp. 786 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (discharged employee with no physical disability not barred from claiming
civil rights violations); Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Hay, 627 S.W.2d 270, 279 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1981) (slander resulting in no actual injury to plaintiff not covered by workers'
compensation and therefore actionable).
176 See, e.g., Hollman v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1259, 1261 (8th Cir.
1983) (bad-faith refusal to pay workers' compensation benefits did not bar valid cause
of action in tort).
177 See, e.g., Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. S: pp. 872, 880-81 (S.D.
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and the kind of harm at issue, sexual harassment may fall under one of
these statutory exceptions. Courts also have held that certain harms, as
a matter of public policy, must lie outside the contemplation of work-
ers' compensation laws. In particular, the availability of no-fault bene-
fits for civil rights violations has been viewed as contrary to the legisla-
tive intent underlying the entire compensation system.Y79 Sexual
harassment, as a clear violation of antidiscrimination law and the gen-
eral public interest, 80 should not be recognized as the kind of harm
that the workers' compensation scheme was intended to remedy. To
permit such a bar to a tort action would undermine the goals of civil
rights legislation.
A strong argument can be made for placing sexual harassment
outside the scope of employment for the purpose of workers' compensa-
tion. Courts have refused to classify certain kinds of harms as occupa-
tional risks that an employee must reasonably expect in the workplace.
For example, in several jurisdictions the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress by an employer or supervisor does not constitute a "ra-
tional consequence of some hazard related to work." ' The argument
for classifying sexual harassment outside the scope of employment is
particularly compelling. The relationship between sexual harassment
and a woman's employment is entirely different from that between a
job-associated risk and the job itself. Harassment arises from an em-
Ga. 1983) (mental trauma not compensable under workers' compensation).
178 See, e.g., Kissinger v. Mannor, 92 Mich. App. 572, 577, 285 N.W.2d 214, 217
(1979) (action against employer for outrageous conduct by supervisor not barred by
workers' compensation because intentional torts outside scope of statute).
1" See, e.g., Renteria v. County of Orange, 83 Cal. App. 3d 833, 841, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 447, 451 (1978) (claim of infliction of emotional distress based on racial insults
belonged to "an entire class of civil wrongs outside the contemplation of workers' com-
pensation system"); Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 420 Mich. 308, 317, 362
N.W.2d 642, 646 (1984) (action for physical, mental and emotional injuries based oi
Michigan Fair Employment Practices Act and Title VII violations; holding right to
compensatory damages under state civil rights' acts would supersede scope of workers'
compensation act); Slayton v. Michigan Host, Inc., 122 Mich. App. 411, 417, 332
N.W.2d 498, 501 (1983) (citations omitted) (holding that workers' compensation
barred claim for mental anguish "would undercut the legislative scheme to remedy
discriminatory wrongs").
180 One court could not "credit the suggestion that the Colorado General Assem-
bly intended to permit licentious behavior under the rubric of workmen's compensa-
tion." Bennett v. Furr's Cafeterias, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 887, 891 (D. Colo. 1982) (plain-
tiff in Title VII action bringing pendent claims for assault, battery, and infliction of
emotional distress).
... Pryor v. United States Gypsum Co., 585 F. Supp. 311, 314 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
(assaults "arising from purely personal and private quarrels" actionable despite work-
ers' compensation statute); see also Iverson v. Atlas Pac. Eng'g, 143 Cal. App. 3d 219,
191 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1983) (employer confining plaintiff against his will); Lagies v.
Copley, 110 Cal. App. 3d 958, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1980) (slander intended to cause
emotional distress).
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ployer or other man's personal motivation to maintain authority over
female workers; in contrast, the occupational hazards covered in most
workers' compensation statutes arise from foreseeable risks inherent to
the work environment. 82 Indeed, several courts have recognized that
sexual harassment's origins are fundamentally personal, not
occupational. 8
In Bennett v. Furr's Cafeterias, Inc.,1 a victim of intangible
harassment brought suit against her employer for Title VII violations,
assault, battery, and infliction of emotional distress. The former man-
agement-trainee alleged that on several occasions her supervisor had
made unwanted sexual advances and physically assaulted her during
business trips. Conceding that the supervisor and employee had acted
"in the course of employment"-that is, during the time of employ-
ment-the court nonetheless decided that the workers' compensation
statutes did not bar the plaintiff's tort claims: "[I]t would appear to lie
outside the bounds of reason to propose that the sort of sexual assault
and harassment heretofore described and emotional trauma alleged to
have been caused thereby result from risks inherent to the position of
'management trainee.' "1185 For similar reasons, the court in Pryor v.
United States Gypsum Co. 8' refused to bar a harassed plaintiff's tort
claims against her employer. Although most of the victim's coworkers
were men, the harassment to which she was subjected could not be
viewed as arising out of employment:
[T]he mere fact that the alleged perpetrators were [the plain-
tiff's] supervisors and employer does not necessarily mean
any resulting injuries arose out of employment so as to bring
them within the Workers' Compensation law. . . . This
court is simply not prepared to say that a female who goes to
work in what is apparently a predominantly male workplace
should reasonably expect sexual harassment as part of her
job.18
7
"8 See Note, supra note 165, at 923.
See, e.g., Pryor, 585 F. Supp. at 316 (intentional tort by employer and super-
visors); Bennett, 549 F. Supp. at 890 (claim of civil rights violations, assault and bat-
tery, and outrageous conduct arising from sexual harassment by employer); Cox v.
Brazo, 165 Ga. App. 888, 888-89, 303 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1983) (negligence claim against
employer for employing supervisor known to engage in sexual harassment); Hollrah v.
Freidrich, 634 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. App. 1982) (action against employer for negligent
hiring).
1" 549 F. Supp. 887 (D. Colo. 1982).
285 Id. at 890.
186 585 F. Supp. 311 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
187 Id. at 316.
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By focusing on the personal nature of harassment and the policy
considerations behind the workers' compensation system, courts should
recognize that sexual harassment is not an occupational hazard. To
treat it as a risk of employment, thereby barring tort actions against an
employer, would serve as an implicit legitimization of sexual harass-
ment in the workplace.
A standard of strict liability would bring sexual harassment within
the scope of employment. In turn, the coverage of workers' compensa-
tion would preclude a tort action against the employer. In order to
overcome the obstacle of workers' compensation, as well as to further
the remedial and deterrent purposes articulated in this Comment, an
employer should be held to a standard of constructive knowledge of
harassment. Thus, an employer who negligently, recklessly, or inten-
tionally fails to prevent or remedy detectable harassment in the work-
place should be held liable to the victim, whether the actual harasser is
a supervisor, coworker, or nonemployee. The effectiveness of this stan-
dard clearly requires a liberal interpretation of "constructive knowl-
edge." Employers must be on special notice when contact with employ-
ees occurs exclusively through agents, when supervisors exercise
authority over employment conditions, when women enter traditionally
male fields, when female employees must wear revealing clothing, and
when traveling constitutes a substantial part of the job."'8
Due to the wide variety of workers' compensation laws, recovery
under the tort of sexual harassment will not be possible in all jurisdic-
tions. If an employer were shielded by an exclusive remedy provision,
the plaintiff would be forced to sue the offending coworker or supervi-
sor directly under a traditional tort theory. Nevertheless, in many juris-
dictions this new tort could provide a necessary supplement to existing
law.
CONCLUSION
The cause of action proposed in this Comment would allow a vic-
tim of sexual harassment in the workplace to obtain full relief for her
harm. The current remedies available under most antidiscrimination
statutes fail to address all the harm caused by harassment. Present tort
law produces unsatisfactory results as well. The proposed theory of lia-
bility, which requires that the standard of recovery be that of a reason-
able woman and holds an employer to a standard of constructive
knowledge, directly addresses a victim's personal injury.
18 See Vermeulen, supra note 2, at 292 (arguing in favor of a broad standard of
constructive knowledge for Title VII violations when harasser is a coworker).
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This cause of action is problematic because, despite the construc-
tive knowledge standard, some workers' compensation statutes may still
bar tort actions against an employer. Furthermore, courts may be re-
luctant to recognize a new theory of recovery, especially in the area of
emotional harm.189 These concerns -demonstrate the desirability of
amending Title VII and state antidiscrimination statutes to include
both legal and equitable remedies for workplace harassment.1 90
Statutory reform, however, requires public support and usually
entails considerable delay."9" In light of the need for current relief, af-
firmative judicial action is necessary.1 92 An independent cause of action
for sexual harassment warrants careful consideration.
18, See, e.g., Note, supra note 140, at 177 ("The utility of [a] cause of action is
dependent on liberal judicial interpretations of the requisite elements, and of the dam-
ages that may be awarded. Judicial conservatism [with respect to sexual harassment]
would certainly retard progress toward recompensing victims through the common
law.").
190 Several writers advocate the amendment of Title VII and state laws. See, e.g.,
Note, supra note 157, at 1466-67 (favoring amendment of Title VII for comprehensive
remedies); Note, supra note 140, at 179 (proposing a model state statute); Note, supra
note 12, at 122 (proposing a modified interpretation or explicit amendment of Title VII
to permit compensatory and punitive damages); see also supra note 10 & accompany-
ing text.
191 Legislative reform may be especially difficult because sexual harassment does
not "engender a high level of opprobrium from all strata of society." See Note, supra
note 140, at 180; see also Comment, Sexual Harassment: A Jurisprudential Analysis,
10 CAP. U.L. REv. 607, 613-17 (doubting the effectiveness of proposing criminal sanc-
tions against harassment because society may view them as attempts to legislate
morality).
a2 See Goodman, supra note 1, at 465 ("Success in continuing the development of
the law will depend to some extent on success in educating judges further about the
perniciousness of sexual harassment."); see also W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 7 (4th ed. 1971) (justifying recognition of new torts when
conduct is "unreasonable, or socially harmful, from the point of view of the commu-
nity"); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 85, at 193 ("Political, social and economic
changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth
grows to meet the demands of society.").
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